ABSTRACT Authentication plays a critical role in securing any online banking system, and many banks and various services have long relied on username/password combos to verify users. Memorizing usernames and passwords for a lot of accounts becomes a cumbersome and inefficient task. Furthermore, legacy authentication methods have failed over and over, and they are not immune against a wide variety of attacks that can be launched against users, networks, or authentication servers. Over the years, data breach reports emphasize that attackers have created numerous high-tech techniques to steal users' credentials, which can pose a serious threat. In this paper, we propose an efficient and practical user authentication scheme using personal devices that utilize different cryptographic primitives, such as encryption, digital signature, and hashing. The technique benefits from the widespread usage of ubiquitous computing and various intelligent portable and wearable devices that can enable users to execute a secure authentication protocol. Our proposed scheme does not require an authentication server to maintain static username and password tables for identifying and verifying the legitimacy of the login users. It not only is secure against password-related attacks, but also can resist replay attacks, shoulder-surfing attacks, phishing attacks, and data breach incidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional authentication schemes such as the username/password combo pose a serious threat to the online banking services, financial systems, and their users. Most current authentication systems assign or allow a user to choose a static and unique user id that acts as a label. This static label is typically attached to the user for a long time. Unfortunately, users tend to use the same user id in many different websites and systems [16] . Furthermore, many users continue to employ the same password across online accounts and systems [15] . According to a recent study [15] , 51% of the surveyed users reuse the same password across different websites, and more than 77% of the participants either slightly change or reuse existing passwords with simple tricks.
This common practice might lead to security risks such as insider attacks. Malicious administrators or insiders, who have access to username and password tables, can leverage the information to access other services and websites. Malicious insiders could even benefit from selling this sensitive information on the dark web using untraceable payment systems such as Bitcoin [34] or Zerocoin [33] .
Furthermore, this practice could allow a phisher to utilize users' credentials on more than one website [10] . Phishing is a type of social engineering attack in which a malicious user, also known as a phisher, attempts fraudulently to acquire legitimate users' credentials by masquerading as a trustworthy entity or public organization. A phishing attack can be carried out using different communication means, such as emails or instant messages, and it usually directs the victim to a fake website that looks like the real one [26] . Such an attacker could target a group of users or a single user and harvest their usernames and passwords and then try to login to critical systems such as online banking. Using static credentials is one of the core problems that allow phishing attacks to succeed. Changing this paradigm by abandoning the usage of static usernames and passwords could modify the game and yield better anti-phishing authentication schemes.
In this paper, we demonstrate how smart personal devices can enhance not only security but also user experience by proposing a one-time username authentication coupled with a secure verification code for each login session. The user does not have to memorize many usernames or recall complex passwords. We outline the main contributions of this paper as follows:
• We design and implement a novel scheme that integrates encryption and signature without requiring users to memorize usernames and passwords. This design provides a better level of security and mitigates risks associated with legacy authentication methods.
• We introduce the concept of user-centric access control, which can play a pivotal role in authentication and enhance security. In user-centric access control, users are in charge, and they can set their account permission for each login session.
• We analyze the correctness of the proposed authentication scheme and show its efficiency and feasibility.
In particular, we analyze the security of the introduced authentication scheme from different angles: phishing attacks, password-related attacks, shoulder-surfing attacks, replay attacks, etc.
• We show how our design obeys the One-Time Pad (OTP) property for the session key and verification code, which increases the security of authentication.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed authentication scheme in terms of communication/computation overhead. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our motivations and the most related work in the literature. Section III provides the system model, threat model, and design goals. In Section IV, we provide a description of the proposed authentication protocol. Section V analyzes the security of our scheme, and Section VI covers the result of experiments along with performance evaluation and comparison. We conclude our work in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATIONS AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we first introduce the motivations of our work, and then present the most related research.
A. MOTIVATIONS
The objectives of this study are to design a novel authentication scheme using dynamic usernames and to diminish the need for storing user's credentials at a centralized location.We envision that the new design should resist many attacks and issues such as keylogger attacks, shoulder-surfing attacks, data breach incidents, password reuse, and other human factors.
Keylogger attacks are becoming more complex and could target static authentication schemes. A keylogger can be a plug-in hardware device or a software program that acts as a malicious process residing on the victim's computer. The primary goal of using keyloggers is to capture and observe every keystroke typed on the victim's computer, which certainly includes authentication information such as usernames and sensitive passwords. Generally speaking, keylogger software and hardware are not easy to detect, especially on public computers. Some sophisticated keylogger software is rooted in the operating system and does not show up in the task manager process list. Although many countermeasures could mitigate the risk of keylogger attacks, many new issues, tools, and techniques are still evolving [22] , [24] , [39] , [35] , [14] . In 2011, with 80% accuracy, researchers illustrated that it is feasible to capture keystrokes of a nearby computer utilizing the accelerometer found in many smartphones [32] . This result emphasizes the belief that there is no silver bullet solution to tackle the keylogger problem in a username and password system, and it is still necessary to improve the traditional authentication schemes.
Shoulder-surfing is another issue that affects the security of traditional authentication schemes. Shoulder-surfing attacks occur when attackers utilize direct observation techniques such as looking over someone's shoulder or using a hidden camera to harvest sensitive information. Unfortunately, shoulder surfing is an effective way to target conventional authentication methods and get passwords, PINs, and other sensitive personal information. It is not hard to launch in practice as a shoulder-surfing attack does not require sophisticated knowledge or a high level of experience. Modern authentication schemes should consider the resistance of shouldersurfing attacks and shrink the attack surface.
Another major driver is the data breaches that have been becoming increasingly sophisticated and daring. Data breaches could have a grave impact on users and financial institutions. Many data breach incidents include the disclosure of usernames and passwords, and several leading experts consider data breaches as one of the biggest security problems faced by security professionals and system administrators. The consequences of a data breach are becoming more and more severe, and it is hard to estimate the damage on the breached organization and the users' accounts in many different online services. In October 2013, Adobe suffered a breach which resulted in the leak of more than 153 million customer records. Each client record contains an internal ID, an email address, a username, and an encrypted password, in addition to a password hint in plaintext [20] . Unfortunately, the password cryptography was poorly designed, and many were easily decrypted to plaintext. Another notable example was the data breach of 13 million user accounts from www.000webhost.com in March 2015. The leaked data contains names, email addresses, and even plaintext passwords. A malicious attacker could leverage these leaked credentials to target users' online banking accounts and perform malicious activities such as disclosing financial information or even transferring money overseas.
The username/password combo is one of the biggest data breach problems based on a report from Verizon in 2014 [41] . The same report indicated that in 76% of the data breaches, attackers were able to gain accesses by using the stolen user credentials. According to the security firm Hold Security [38] , a cyber gang breached over 420,000 web and FTP sites to harvest more than 1.2 billion credentials; this incident could be one of the largest data breaches reported to the media.
All previously mentioned breaches, attacks, and issues could lead to a serious problem called the domino effect of password reuse [25] . A domino effect is the result of one password file falling into the hand of a malicious user, who can then use it to infiltrate other online accounts.
Another serious issue of the username/password combo is the large number of usernames and passwords a user should manage on the Internet. The growth of e-banking, e-commerce, and e-government has led to a massive increase in the number of credentials handled by users. TeleSign research [40] , for instance, reported that an active web user manages an average of 24 passwords on a daily basis. Unfortunately, the same study stated that 73% of the accounts use duplicate passwords. In addition, 68% of the surveyed participants indicated that they wanted online companies to provide a new security solution to secure their personal information. Users are thus poorly equipped on a cognitive level to deal with today's needs for multiple usernames and passwords, which leads to credential reuse on different accounts and systems.
Human factors, such as writing usernames and passwords down or choosing passwords that are easy to remember, harmfully affect the security of traditional authentication schemes. These factors motivate us to design an authentication system that is more secure and easy to use. In our proposed design, users are not involved in creating usernames or choosing passwords; furthermore, users are not required to remember or manage a large number of passwords.
B. RELATED WORK
A large number of schemes focus on the authentication in general [4] , [11] , [17] , [21] , [27] . Hiltgen et al. proposed two different authentication protocols for e-banking using shorttime passwords and certificates [23] .
Gorman categorized user authentication into three categories: knowledge-based (e.g., a password), object-based (e.g., a car key-less entry), and ID-based (e.g., a fingerprint) [19] . Brainard et al. [8] explored a fourth factor which is based on the concept of vouching for somebody you know. Recently, the authors in [3] proposed a secure authentication scheme using dual channels in rogue access point environments.
Another line of research is more concerned with payment card verification [1] , [2] , in which the authors utilized users' smart devices in the cardholder verification for payment card systems. Marforio et al. [31] proposed using smartphones as practical and secure location verification tokens for payments at the point of sales.
Google Authenticator or 2-Step Verification [18] is a software-based technique that provides a second layer of defense. The application generates two-step verification codes that can be used in addition to the account password. Another widely used technique is RSA SecurID [9] , which is a software or hardware token that generates a new verification code (a six-digit number) at fixed intervals. The generated code is based on a seed that is specific for each token and registered with the authentication server. In order to complete successful authentication, the server's clock must be synchronized with the authentication token's built-in clock.
Different from existing works, we exploit dynamic authentication credentials along with user-centric access control to solve the static credential problem. Our approach is to introduce one-time usernames utilizing user's smart devices and cryptographic primitives such as encryption, digital signature, and hashing. The goal is to create a unique username and password set for each session such that various security vulnerabilities in conventional, static username and password systems can be tackled.
III. MODELS AND GOALS
In this section, we cover the main components of our system model, threat model, design goals, and notations.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , our system model consists of two major entities: client and server. The client side includes the registered devices and the user's terminal. In the following, we briefly summarize the primary functions of each entity.
• Registered devices: A registered device is a smart personal device such as a smartwatch or a smartphone, and it is able to perform cryptographic operations. Each user needs to register a device with the server in order to get the server's services. A legitimate user should be able to get services from the server without providing a static username and password. In this paper, we assume that the user has already registered a smart device with the server.
• User's terminal: A user's terminal is an electronic device such as a laptop or a desktop and it is utilized to log in to the server to view or perform transactions.
• Server: The server belongs to an entity such as a bank, and it is connected with a hardware security module HSM that safeguards the private key and provides crypto-processing. The server distributes its public key and verification code to the clients and provides services.
B. THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we assume the semi-honest model [28] , in which the server and the clients correctly follow the protocol VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 1. The system model of the proposed design.
specification but both attempt to learn as much information as possible. Note that this adversarial model does not involve a powerful attacker who can control the device and access the private key -we leave this consideration in our future research.
C. DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we identify the following goals that the protocol should satisfy.
• Correctness: If both the client and server follow the protocol honestly, the client and server can achieve a correct authentication result.
• Security: The protocol can protect the privacy of the client's data. On one hand, given the encrypted message, the attacker cannot get the client's original input data. On the other hand, the correct result is also hidden from an attacker.
• Verification: The client's message and verification code must be successfully verified by the server.
D. NOTATIONS
The notations and their semantic meanings utilized in this paper to describe our scheme are presented in Table 1 :
IV. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
This section is dedicated to describing the proposed protocol, which can be used in different domains such as online banking, e-government, and e-Health systems. We are going to use the online banking system to demonstrate our protocol. We start by presenting the ticket information, then detailing the overall protocol steps.
A. SESSION TICKETS
A user resorts to its registered device to generate a ticket for each session when the user wants to login to his account. The registered device generates the ticket and sends it to the server for verification. The transmission of the ticket from the registered device to the server is encrypted with the server's public key. As shown in Fig. 2 , a login ticket consists primarily of a one-time username OTU , a session key k, a ticket validity period TVP, a timestamp T , and an access control list ACL. The ticket information is described as follows.
1) ONE-TIME USERNAME
It consists of 8 characters including capital letters, small letters, numbers, and special characters. The one-time username should be generated randomly using the registered device. We choose eight characters because many systems are configured to handle eight characters.
2) SESSION KEY
A registered device (e.g. smartphone) randomly generates a session key for each login session. The session key is a symmetric key that will be used to encrypt the verification code between the server and the user.
3) TICKET VALIDITY PERIOD
It is a security parameter that limits the lifespan of a ticket. In our design, we give the user the ability to specify the ticket validity period (e.g. 5 min); however, security administrators can set a maximum lifetime for tickets.
4) TIMESTAMP
A timestamp is a time instance at which the registered device issues a ticket. The timestamp is presented in a consistent format, allowing the server for easy comparison of two different tickets and for tracking users' login activities over time.
5) ACCESS CONTROL LIST
The user specifies the access control list. With respect to our design in this paper, it is a list of permissions attached to a ticket, and it can be different for each login session. For simplicity, we assume that there are two permission modes:
• Active mode permission: The active mode allows users to perform actions on the account. For example, in an online banking system, when the user selects this permission, it gives him the ability to fully control the account. This includes different privileged activities such as performing transactions, requesting banking services, and adding or deleting fund transfer beneficiaries in the account.
• Passive mode permission: The passive mode restricts the users to view the transactions, but not to perform any active operation any further. Specifying permissions provides a user-centric access control model and makes the users engage in the setting of a ticket permission. It has many advantages such as better security by utilizing the principle of least privilege. Such a design considers the principle of giving a user account only those privileges that are essential to that user's work. However, specifying permissions increases the overhead on users and requires an awareness training program.
B. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 1) PARAMETERS
In this subsection, we describe the cryptographic parameters employed in our design:
• Elliptic curve cryptography: We adopt the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). The ECDSA-256 algorithm with key size of 256-bit and SHA-256 hash function is used to sign the ticket by the registered device, and ECIES-256 with key size of 256-bit is utilized to encrypt the ticket by the registered device.
• The registered device holds its public key e 1 and private key d 1 , which is constructed based on the ECDSA-256 cryptosystem. In this work, ECDSA-256 is utilized to sign and verify the login tickets.
• The server generates its public key e 2 and private key d 2 based on the ECIES-256 cryptosystem, which is used to guarantee the confidentiality.
• We utilize the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the symmetric cryptosystem to ensure the confidentiality of the verification code.
Algorithm 1 Sign and Encrypt 1) The registered device generates the ticket
2) The registered device signs H (M ) using the ECDSA signature:
The registered device encrypts M along with the signature σ : C = E e 2 (M σ ) 4) The registered device sends C to the server.
2) DESCRIPTION
In this subsection, we present our authentication protocol. This protocol consists of four algorithms: Algorithm 1 provides the details regarding how to sign and encrypt the ticket information; Algorithm 2 describes the decryption and verification of the ticket information; Algorithm 3 is used by the server to verify the user based on the received ticket; and Algorithm 4 is employed by the user to decrypt the verification code.
Before starting the protocol, a user should specify two parameters: the permission of the ticket ACL (e.g. passive mode), and the ticket validity period TVP (e.g. 5 minutes). The following steps describe the complete protocol for requesting a ticket and verifying a user by the server.
Step 1 The registered device generates a ticket M with the following information: a randomly generated onetime username OTU , a randomly generated session key k, a timestamp T , the required permission ACL, and the specified ticket validity period TVP:
Algorithm 2 Decrypt and Verify
1) The server receives and decrypts C to get M using equation (4) , which consists of
2) The server verifies the signature σ : σ e 1 ? = H (OTU k TVP T ACL). If it is passed, the server waits for the user to login; otherwise, the request is discarded.
Algorithm 3 Server Verification 1)
The server receives an OTU and checks whether or not this OTU has a valid, associated ticket. 2) The server generates VC.
3) The server encrypts VC using k to obtain Enc k (VC). 4) The server sends Enc k (VC) to the user.
Algorithm 4 User Verification
Once the user logs in using OTU .
1) The registered device receives the encrypted verification code Enc k (VC). 2) The registered device decrypts Enc k (VC) using k:
Dec k (Enc k (VC)) = VC.
3) The registered device shows the VC to the user. 4) The user enters the VC to login to the server, which can authenticate the user.
Step 2 The registered device signs the login ticket using its private key d 1 to get the signature σ and then encrypts the login ticket using the server's public key e 2 :
Step 3 The registered device sends the encrypted ticket to the server using the GSM network or the Internet. This message acts as a secure notification for the server that the client is willing to login within a few minutes. Once the encrypted ticket is received, the server decrypts the ticket using its private key d 2 to get the ticket information {OTU , k, TVP, T , ACL} and the signature σ :
Step 4 The server stores all the ticket information and logs it in his user login list ULL; the server also verifies the signature σ using the registered device's public key e 1 :
If (5) is established, the signature is valid; otherwise, the server discards the ticket.
Step 5 The user should login to the server using OTU within the ticket validity period TVP.
Step 6 The server randomly generates a verification code VC, and then encrypts it using the session key k. The server sends the encrypted verification code Enc k (VC) to the registered device, which can decrypt the message using the session key k.
Step 7 The user enters the verification code at the server, and then the server verifies the entered verification code and authorizes the user based on the ticket permission ACL.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed authentication scheme under different attacks, and show how the cryptographic primitives and security services utilized in our work can counter these attacks. We assume that the registered device has a secure environment to perform cryptographic computations. We also assume that the authentication server is secured and is fully compliant with The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard requirements PCI DSS [37] .
A. PHISHING ATTACKS
Many phishing attacks are designed to steal credentials such as username and password by masquerading as a trustworthy entity. The proposed authentication can help reduce the risk associated with phishing attacks. In fact, the proposed method is an anti-phishing technique since there is no static username or password. For each authentication session, there is always a new username and password. We consider the proposed design an anti-phishing authentication protocol for the following reasons:
• In our scheme, a username is generated to be used within one session by the user, and it is valid for a limited time.
• We use a secure channel for verification and a usercentric access control for authorization.
• In our scheme, there is no concept of username or password update.
Although the proposed method does not prevent phishing, it can help mitigate the risk associated with phishing attacks.
B. PASSWORD-RELATED ATTACKS
The proposed design provides protection against many password-related attacks such as shoulder-surfing attacks and direct observation attacks. The client is now prevented from using static usernames and passwords that can be recognized by using thermal imaging, or by identifying the pressed keys using a mechanical vibration analysis [2] . Issues such as using the client's birthday as the password, using the same password everywhere, or forgetting the password are avoided since we rely on a set of dynamic username and password that is unique for each login session.
There is no doubt that there is a more subtle risk when a user chooses the same username and password for several servers. Some services and service providers might not be as trustworthy as others; a server administrator or internal employee with high privileges can access the username and password file and potentially gain access to user's accounts on other servers. Using the proposed design, the client's device can essentially generate a different set of username and password each time the client tries to authenticate.
C. SHOULDER-SURFING ATTACKS
Using a static username and password combo also suffers from the shoulder-surfing attack, which is commonly used to harvest sensitive information, such as the password [2] . A malicious attacker using different direct observation techniques observes the victim and obtains its credentials. One straightforward method is to look over the victim's shoulder to capture a password. Shoulder-surfing attacks can also be performed long distance away with the aid of visionenhancing devices. To prevent the risk of shoulder surfing, we use dynamic credentials that are generated and used once so that harvesting login information from victims provides no advantage to the attackers.
D. REPLAY ATTACKS
On the client side, a client updates its one-time username and its session key for each authentication request. Also, the ticket expires after it has been used or after a very short period of time. Timestamping along with the User Login List ULL provides an effective way of preventing a replay attack.
Notice that the server generates a verification code that is valid for a very short time (e.g. 5 minutes), which is used only once to verify the client's identity. Thus we claim that the server can resist the replay attacks.
E. CLIENT REQUEST PROTECTION
In our scheme, a client's authentication request is signed via a signature, which is secure and can guarantee the authenticity and data integrity of the client's message. The client's authentication request and signature are encrypted using the server's public key based on ECIES. Since ECIES is provably secure in the random oracle model, the confidentiality of the signed and encrypted messages can be guaranteed.
F. SERVER RESPONSE PROTECTION
When the server receives the message that includes the ticket information, the server decrypts the message to get the client's request and signature. Then the server verifies the identity of the client. If it is an unauthorized user, the server discards the ticket; otherwise, the server waits for the user to login. When the user logs in using OTU , the server generates the verification code and encrypts it using the session key, then sends the encrypted verification code to the client. After receiving the encrypted verification code, only the client can decrypt it to get the verification code because k is the shared session key known only by the client and the server.
Therefore during the response procedure, the confidentiality of the response message is ensured.
G. ONE-TIME PAD PROPERTY
In the proposed protocol, the one-time username, session key, and verification code are updated for each login session; consequently, they have the property of One-Time Pad (OTP). It is well known that OTPs can guarantee confidentiality. Since the session key, one-time username, and verification code are randomly generated by the registered device and the server, they are unrelated to any previous session key and verification code. Therefore, an adversary cannot decrypt the ciphered response to any request.
H. LIMITATIONS
Our scheme is similar to MP-Auth, electronic payment app, ticketing, and access control systems, which require both a secure execution environment on smartphones and an underlying security architecture to isolate trusted and untrusted components to prevent leakage and unintended manipulation of security-critical data such as the private key. Please note that in our thread model, we do not consider a powerful attacker who can control the device and access the private key. We leave this study in our future research.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In this section, we measure the communication overhead and computational overhead of the scheme. Then we compare our work with various schemes using a widely used evaluation framework.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
We analyze the communication overhead in terms of the parameter size and the ciphertext size. We choose the OneTime Username OTU to be 8 bytes, the session key k to be 128 bits, and the size of the access control field to be 4 bits. Also, the size of the ticket validity period TVP is set to 4 bits, and the timestamp is 32 bits. We choose the ECIES-256 cryptosystem to guarantee confidentiality, and use another ECDSA-256 cryptosystem to sign the message; we also adopt AES 128-bit to protect the verification code security.
To complete step 1 in Section IV, the registered device generates the ticket M = OTU ||k||TVP||T ||ACL with a size of |OTU | + |k| + |TVP| + |T | + |ACL| = 8 + 128/8 + 4/8 + 4/8 + 32/8 = 29 bytes. For step 2, the device employs ECIES-256 to encrypt the whole message to get the ciphertext C, and then sends the ciphertext to the server along with the signature. Because the size of the ciphertext is less than 512 bit, the communication overhead is 64 + 64 = 128 bytes. Moving to step 6, the server adopts AES 128-bit to encrypt the verification code, and then sends the ciphertext to the client. Because the size of a ciphertext is 16 bytes, the communication overhead is 16 bytes. So, the total communication overhead is 128 + 16 = 144 bytes.
In Table 2 , we assume that there are N clients. Each client makes m requests with the server. The total communication 
TABLE 3.
A comparison study with five current works using Bonneau et al .'s framework, which is based on security, deployability, and usability metrics. For other systems and how they compare to our work, the interested reader is referred to [6] . Comparisons are with closely related authentication schemes, where -stands for the case where the metric does not apply, • stands for meeting the metric, • means that the metric is somewhat offered in the design.
overhead for a client is 144m bytes. For a group of N clients, the communication overhead is 144 × N × m.
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
Consider the following two sets of operations: the first set contains ECIES-256 encryption and decryption, and ECDSA-256 signature and verification, and the second set includes AES encryption/decryption, and hash operations. The computational cost of the second set is negligible compared to that of the first set [13] . Table 4 summarizes the operations of ECIES-256 encryption and decryption, ECDSA-256 signature and verification, and the computational cost of each operation. In this table, we denote the computational cost of ECIES-256 encryption and decryption as C en and C de , respectively, and ECDSA-256 signature and verification as C sn and C ve , respectively.
We further evaluate the computational cost of our protocol from the client side and the server side. On the client side, the registered device generates a signature σ and then encrypts the ticket and the signature. This procedure includes the sign operation C sn and encryption operation C en ; thus the computational cost is C sn + C en .
On the server side, the computational cost lies in the process of decryption and verification. The server carries out one decryption operation C de and one ECDSA verification operation C ve for a complete login session; thus the combined overhead is C de + C ve . We also conduct experiments on a 2.2GHz-processor computing machine to record the computational cost of cryptographic operations. Our results indicate that ECIES-256 encryption and decryption operation costs are 5.65 ms and 3.98 ms, respectively, and the ECDSA-256 signature and verification operation costs are 2.88 ms and 8.53, respectively. Table 5 summarizes the computational cost of one client, with each making n r requests. Since each client needs to perform signature and encryption operations for each request, the cost is n r × (5.65 + 2.88) = 8.53n r ms. Similarly, the computational cost of the server is n r × (3.98 + 8.53) = 12.51n r ms.
C. COMPARISON
We now evaluate our system using Bonneau et al.'s framework, which is widely used in the research community. Bonneau et al. [6] proposed a framework to evaluate an authentication scheme based on 25 various metrics that cover different aspects of security, usability, and deployability. In addition, they proposed an extensive comparison study over 35 schemes based on the proposed framework. Later, the framework became widely known and cited in the literature to evaluate and compare different categories of authentication schemes [7] , [42] , [29] . The interested readers are referred to [6] for more details about the definitions of those metrics, and for figuring out how to apply them to various authentication mechanisms in the literature.
In our comparison study, we focus our attention on five different schemes that are closely related to our work. It can be clearly seen that our design outperforms many proposed schemes with respect to the security metrics since we utilize various cryptographic primitives that facilitate meeting the framework security requirements. Table 3 illustrates how the proposed solution meets the security requirements.
For deployability, the framework focuses on assessing how much change would be needed in existing systems in order to get the proposed system implemented. Our solution is nonproprietary, and the modifications that would need to be done both on the client and the server are minimal. Similarly, the cost-per-user of our scheme is minimal as well. In addition, the proposed scheme is very accessible since users who can use passwords are not prevented from using the proposed scheme by any condition.
Finally for usability, our proposed scheme is easy-tolearn and easy-to-use since users do nothing beyond entering a one time username and verification code. Also, it is memorywise-effortless because users of our scheme do not have to remember any secret at all. Based on the framework, our solution is scalable for users since it reduces the risk of username/password reuse across many sites and services. It is important to note that we are utilizing a personal device that is carried by the user most of the time and the user does not need to carry an additional hardware or any physical object for authentication.
In terms of efficiency, our goal is to ensure that the computational cost should be low on the clients. The computational cost of our proposed scheme on the client side is 8.53 ms. On the other hand; the computational cost of Phoolproof on the client is less than two seconds on average, which is acceptable in most cases [36] . For password and Google2-Step Verification, the computational cost is negligible since the user enters a password for the former and enters a onetime code for the latter. MP-Auth scheme requires less than a second on the client side, which is believed to be a tolerable delay [5] . Finally, Cronto, which is a commercial authentication system, requires the user to use a camera phone or a dedicated hardware device to capture the cryptogram. The company indicates that the computation time on clients is less than 1 second. Moreover, our solution offers cost efficiency for banks -avoiding the cost of providing users with hardware tokens or dedicated tokens (as well as the maintenance cost of extra hardware or tokens).
Furthermore, our solution provides more security features for users where they can set their account permission for each login session. Given this evaluation, we believe that our proposed solution performs very well against the Bonneau et al.'s metric and compares favorably with the authentication schemes investigated in the Bonneau et al. study.
VII. CONCLUSION
The extraordinary growth of online banking and e-commerce systems has led to a huge increase in the number of usernames and passwords managed by individual users. Conventional static username and password protocols suffer from various security issues. Many users start using duplicated credentials over and over again in various accounts and systems. Leaking or compromising one account could cause an attacker to infiltrate other systems and endanger users' security and privacy. In this paper, we introduce a new authentication model that allows users to get rid of many issues such as memorizing usernames and passwords for many different websites and systems. The proposed authentication scheme paves the way for user-centric access control that helps minimize the risks of many attacks.
There are several research directions that can be further explored in our future research. First of all, we would like to investigate using lightweight cryptographic techniques in our design. Second, we plan to scrutinize the design of different user-centric access control models. Also, we intend to study techniques for improving the authentication methods such as using visual decryption and visual signature verification. Finally, reporting on usability of the proposed authentication scheme should be further investigated in our future research.
